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proposed for sovereigns should be applied to institutions with high ratings.
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bined with the negative deposit rates on excess reserves at the ECB.
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1. Originally, in the ECB’s
January documents and
speeches, the programme
was referred to as the
Extended Asset Purchase
Programme (EAPP), but its
name seems to have
changed since the March
press conference, so for
simplicity we refer to it as
the PSPP.
2. Draghi (2015).
3. For the details see Draghi
(2015) and ECB (2015a,
2015b, 2015c, 2015d and
2015e).
ON 22 JANUARY 2015 the European Central Bank
(ECB) announced a massive expansion of its
asset purchase programme. To supplement the
ECB's Asset-Backed Securities and Covered Bonds
Purchase Programmes (ABSPP and CBPP3) origi-
nally launched in September 2014, the ECB intro-
duced a new Public Sector Purchase Programme
(PSPP)1. Under the PSPP, the Eurosystem will buy
sovereign bonds from euro-area governments and
securities from European institutions and national
agencies. The purchases started on 9 March 2015
and will last at least until September 2016. The
ECB Governing Council also made it clear that the
programme is open-ended and that purchases will
be conducted until the ECB sees “a sustained
adjustment in the path of inflation which is con-
sistent with the aim of achieving inflation rates
below, but close to, 2 percent over the medium
term”2.
This Policy Contribution examines the detail of
how quantitative easing will actually take place in
the euro area, and its implications. All details avail-
able on the programme come from the introduc-
tory statement to the 22 January press
conference by ECB President Mario Draghi, a press
release published by the ECB on the same day, the
account of the January Governing Council meet-
ing published four weeks later, two press releases
published after the 5 March press conference and
the official ECB decision to be published in the Offi-
cial Journal of the EU3.
Even if some details are still missing because the
Governing Council wants to keep some flexibility
to adjust its policy, we explain in the next section
how the programme will be implemented given the
current ECB guidelines. We also detail what secu-
rities are currently available and which could be
purchased by the ECB and the national central
banks (NCBs) of the Eurosystem. In the next sec-
tion, we consider potential difficulties in the imple-
mentation of quantitative easing because of the
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rules set by the ECB. In particular we look at the
size and the length of the programme and the dis-
tribution of purchases across countries. We then
estimate the direct impact on the public finances
of euro-area member states through the repatria-
tion of the profits from public sector debt securi-
ties to the various euro-area treasuries, before
drawing some conclusions.
THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMME GUIDELINES
What will be bought and by whom?
In January, the ECB decided that the programme
will consist of monthly asset purchases of €60 bil-
lion. Figure 1 shows how the Eurosystem's
monthly purchases will be allocated to different
assets.
Approximately €10 billion – the average value of
the monthly asset-backed securities and covered
bond purchases since the programmes were
started in October 2014 – will continue to be
devoted to covered bonds and asset-backed
securities.
The additional €50 billion will be directed towards
the PSPP: €6 billion per month (12 percent of the
PSPP) will go towards the purchase of the debt of
supranational institutions located in the euro area
and denominated in euros (see Table 1 for the list
of eligible European institutions). 
The remaining €44 billion will be used mainly to
purchase sovereign debt securities, divided into
€4 billion held by the ECB (8 percent of the €50
billion of additional purchases) and €40 billion
held by the NCBs. However, a part will also be used
to buy bonds issued by national agencies located
in the euro area (see the list of eligible agencies
in Table 2). The ECB has not specified what share
of the €44 billion should be spent specifically on
these bonds, and the NCBs will be allowed to
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choose themselves between sovereign bonds and
the bonds of the agencies in their jurisdictions4.
The outstanding amount of debt of the agencies is
relatively small compared to the total amount of
sovereign bonds, and they are located in three
countries: Germany, France and Spain. For these
reasons, they will only play a limited role. Never-
theless, as we will discuss, these bonds could
4. The NCBs will “focus
exclusively on their home
market” (ECB, 2015d).
5. ECB (2015c): “This initial
list may be amended fol-
lowing the Governing Coun-
cil meeting on 15 April 2015
on the basis of monetary
policy considerations and
duly reflecting risk manage-
ment issues”, and ECB
(2015e): “Eurosystem cen-
tral banks may, in excep-
tional circumstances,
propose to the Governing
Council public non-financial
corporations located in their
jurisdiction as issuers of
marketable debt instru-
ments to be purchased as
substitutes in case the
envisaged amount to be
purchased in marketable
debt instruments issued by
central governments or
recognised agencies
located in their jurisdiction
cannot be acquired”.
6. The capital keys are used
to calculate an NCB’s share
of the ECB’s capital and
reflect “the respective coun-
try’s share in the total popu-
lation and gross domestic
product of the EU”. For the
purposes of this paper, we
have adjusted the capital
keys for euro-area NCBs
only.
play a back-up role in Germany to push back the
limits, and, for other countries, the ECB will con-
sider expanding the list of agencies if necessary5.
In terms of allocation by country of the €44 billion,
it will simply be split between all euro-area coun-
tries according to the ECB capital keys6. To be pur-
chased in the secondary market, the bonds must
have a remaining maturity of two to 30 years, be
denominated in euros and eligible as collateral for
60 bn €
10 bn € 44 bn € 6 bn €
CBs + ABSs Gov. bonds 
+ agencies
Supranational 
bonds
Total monthly purchases
European Central Bank
4 bn € 40 bn €
National Central Banks
Banco de España
Bundesbank
Banque de France
ECB profits
Member state treasuries
Spanish treasury
German treasury
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Figure 1: Allocation of monthly asset purchases by the Eurosystem
Source: Bruegel, ECB.
Table 1: Eligible supranational issuers in the euro area
Recognised issuers and outstanding euro-denominated
debt in face value, € billion, 2015
Total 2-30 yearmaturity
European Financial Stability Facility 226.0 204.0
European Investment Bank 228.5 206.5
European Stability Mechanism 50.2 20.0
European Union 56.2 44.9
European Atomic Energy Community* - -
Council of Europe Devt. Bank** 5.0 -
Nordic Investment Bank** 1.4 -
Source: ECB (2015c), Datastream, Nordic Investment Bank
Annual Report 2013, Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report
2013. Note: *The EAEC continues to exist de jure, but de facto it is
now under the executive authority of the EU. We could not find
any outstanding debt for this institution. **The Council of Europe
Development Bank and the Nordic Investment Bank cases are
included even if their members include countries outside the euro
area and the EU. We could not find the maturity distribution of
debt securities for these institutions.
Table 2: Eligible national agencies in the euro area
Recognised issuers and outstanding euro-denominated
debt in face value, € billion, 2015
Total 2-30 yearmaturity
Instituto de Credito Oficial (Spain) 34.79 14.4
KfW** (Germany) 153.5 105.5
Landeskreditbank Baden-Württem-
berg Foerderbank (Germany) 13.28 7.43
Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank
(Germany) 12.5 9.5
NRW.Bank (Germany) 20.15 10.45
CADES*** (France) 97.89 79.88*
UNEDIC**** (France) 17.85 13.65
Source: ECB (2015c), investors’ presentations and financial
reports on agency websites. Note: *>1-year maturity; ** Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau; *** Caisse d'amortissement de la dette
sociale; **** Union Nationale Interprofessionnelle pour l'Emploi
dans l'Industrie et le Commerce.
includes holdings “in all of the portfolios of the
Eurosystem central banks”. It thus includes bonds
purchased during the Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP) – which concerned Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain – and other
holdings of Eurosystem central banks (which are
held by NCBs for investment purposes).
The 33 percent issuer holdings limit is imple-
mented “with the aim of preserving market func-
tioning and allowing the formation of a market
price on a given security,” (ECB, 2015b) and will
be applied to all eligible outstanding debt with a
residual maturity of two to 30 years. Since one
cannot hold more than 25 percent of total eligible
debt securities without breaching the 25 percent
issue limit for some bonds at least, this means
that the ECB felt compelled to add this limit
because the Eurosystem already holds more than
25 percent of some bond issues, due to SMP or
other portfolio holdings.
However, in practice, if we assume that in every
country the legacy holdings maturity distribution
follows the same distribution as the current out-
standing debt securities, the 33 percent holdings
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ECB monetary policy operations (either the coun-
try has a sufficiently high rating or is benefiting
from an EU financial assistance programme).
Finally, the Governing Council also decided in
March (ECB, 2015c) that bonds yielding less than
the deposit rate (-0.2 percent in March 2015) will
be excluded from the purchases.
What are the 25 and 33 percent limits about?
On top of the eligibility criteria, the Governing
Council also decided to put in place a 25 percent
issue limit and a 33 percent issuer limit on
Eurosystem holdings.
The 25 percent issue limit is imposed to prevent
the ECB from having “a blocking minority in a debt
restructuring involving collective action clauses”
(ECB, 2015c) (see Box 1). This indicates that the
ECB does not want to be in a position in which it
has the power to block a potential vote on the
restructuring of ECB-held debt of a euro-area coun-
try, because not blocking such a restructuring
could be interpreted as monetary financing of a
member state. As specified by the Governing
Council (ECB 2015e), the 25 percent issue limit
BOX 1: COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES (CACS) IN EUROPE
On 2 February 2012, the ESM treaty mandated the inclusion of CACs “in all new euro-area government
securities, with maturity above one year,” as of 1 January 2013. The role of a CAC is to allow for easier
coordination of investors, thus mitigating the potential for holdouts to hinder a debt restructuring
process.
The model CAC (EFC, 2012), which is now included in all newly issued euro-area government secu-
rities, provides a codified way for implementing individual series modifications (alterations in the
terms and conditions of a bond including changes in payment dates or payment amounts) and cross-
series modifications. A series is defined as an issue and any further taps, ie the tranches of debt
securities that are identical in all respects (same face value, same maturity, same coupon) except
for their date of issuance or first payment date. Since it seems that the ECB does not want to vote in
favour of restructurings that could be interpreted as monetary financing of a member state, if the
ECB owns too large a share of a series of bonds, it would automatically prevent such modifications.
The model CAC makes explicit the voting requirements necessary to arrive at either type of modifi-
cation. Concerning both a single series modification and cross-series modifications, if the Eurosys-
tem were to hold more than 25 percent of a single issue (thereby holding more than 25 percent of a
series if there have been no taps), it would be able to block a vote at a bond-holder meeting from
reaching the necessary 75 percent threshold.
However, while the Eurosystem may already hold more than 25 percent of an issue of a country’s
debt through SMP or other portfolio holdings (and we know this is the case at least for Greece), such
holdings might not result in any blocking power on the part of the Eurosystem, because the securi-
ties markets purchases came to a close in February 2012, and the mandatory CAC did not come into
effect until 1 January 2013.
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7. For a more detailed expla-
nation of how we estab-
lished when limits could be
binding in different coun-
tries, see the Annex.
8. In this paper, we focus on
the PSPP. For more details
on potential ABS and cov-
ered bonds purchases by
the ECB, see for instance
Claeys et al (2014) or
Merler (2014).
the euro area stood at about €6.2 trillion at face
value (or around €7.3 trillion at market value), with
80 percent coming from the four biggest countries
(€1.4 trillion in Italy, €1.5 trillion in France, €1.2
trillion in Germany, and €0.8 trillion in Spain).
The outstanding amount of euro-area sovereign
debt securities eligible for the PSPP in March 2015
is about €4.3 trillion at face value (or around €5.3
trillion at market value). This results from both
excluding the bonds outside the 2-30 year matu-
rity range chosen by the ECB for the purchases,
and excluding bonds yielding less than the
deposit rate. In Germany, the only country that
could be affected by the exclusion of bonds yield-
ing below -0.2 percent at the moment, eligible debt
as of March 2015 falls from €787 billion to €659
billion because of this rule.
Concerning the maturity distribution of sovereign
bonds, it is also interesting to see that most bonds
– three quarters of the 2-30 year range for the
euro area as a whole – have a remaining maturity
of less than 10 years and that, therefore, most of
the purchases will take place within this range as
the ECB intends to be as “market-neutral” (ECB,
2015d) as possible by mimicking the current
maturity distribution in its purchases. As an exam-
ple, Figure 3 shows the distribution of bonds for
the euro area's four biggest countries in the matu-
rity range selected by the ECB.
Concerning supranational European debt securi-
ties, focusing on debt issued by the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) and the EU, the outstanding debt
denominated in euros is limited to €560.9 billion
in face value (or €611.1 billion at market value).
Moreover, the amount in the 2-30 year range rep-
resents only €475.4 billion (or €524.0 billion at
market value). Figure 4 depicts the maturity dis-
tribution of the bonds for these four European
institutions. 
Although it is a bit early to start discussing the end
of QE in Europe, it is interesting to determine for
how long the PSPP might affect the size of the
Eurosystem balance sheet if the ECB decides to
keep all purchased bonds to maturity. Given the
maturity distributions we have discussed, after
limit should only be a concern for Greek bonds, as
this is the only country for which the Eurosystem
already holds more than 25 percent of the two to
30 year residual maturity debt. In fact, SMP hold-
ings of Greek debt as of 31 December 2014 also
exceeded the 33 percent limit at 34.6 percent of
outstanding eligible debt. As these SMP holdings
are redeemed and the share drops below the 33
percent line, the ECB and the Greek Central Bank
will be able to start purchasing assets from hold-
outs (i.e. the bondholders who rejected the 2012
Greek debt exchange and who still hold Greek
bonds), while considering both limits. Purchases
must be such that PSPP holdings plus SMP and
other previous holdings do not violate the aggre-
gate 33 percent limit, while accumulated PSPP
purchases do not violate the 25 percent issue
limit7.
What euro-area debt securities are available?8
The composition of debt (in terms debt securities,
loans and financial assistance loans) is very dif-
ferent in each country (Figure 2), but debt securi-
ties remain the primary debt instrument used by
euro-area governments.
Looking more closely at sovereign debt securities,
in March 2015, the total outstanding amount for
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Figure 2: Decomposition of consolidated gross
debt for euro-area countries, % GDP, 2013
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, European Commission,
EFSF, EFSM, ESM, Irish National Treasury Management
Agency, Banco de Portugal, Cyprus Ministry of Finance. Note:
Eurostat does not provide more recent data than end of 2013
allowing us to make this disaggregation by types of
instrument. Note also that currency and deposits appear in
the chart because they are included in the sovereign debt
according to the Maastricht definition used by Eurostat.
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the Eurosystem stops buying bonds it will only
take a decade for most of the purchases to leave
the ECB’s balance sheet. Of course, it will take
more than 30 years for all the bonds purchased to
be redeemed, but almost half should be redeemed
in slightly more than five years, and 75 percent in
around 10 years, given the bond maturity distri-
bution skewed towards the short term, and given
the willingness of the ECB to be market neutral.
Figure 5 shows how the PSPP holdings of sover-
eign and supranational bonds will evolve assum-
ing purchases stop in September 2016.
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Figure 3: Outstanding sovereign debt securities by residual maturity (market value), March 2015
Source: Bruegel based on Datastream, Agence France Trésor, Deutschland Finanzagentur, Dipartamento del Tesoro, Tesoro Público.
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Figure 4: Outstanding debt of European institutions by residual maturity (market value), March 2015
Source: Bruegel based on Datastream, EFSF, ESM, EIB and EU.
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Figure 5: Holdings of sovereign and supranational bonds purchased through QE, € billions
Source: Bruegel.
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will only really start in August 2015, because the
ECB already holds more than 33 percent of
Greece's eligible debt securities. For Portugal,
bond purchases would have to be much smaller
after January 2017 because the limit will be
reached and the Eurosystem will only be able to
buy from new issuances. The Latvian case is also
relevant because it shows that the bonds of coun-
tries with very small debts will not be significantly
included in the PSPP, because the limit will be
reached after only two months of purchases. In
our view, the German case is also paramount
because it shows that even though the ECB has
affirmed that the PSPP is open-ended, the ECB
cannot go on with meaningful asset purchases for
an extended period because the limits could be
reached quite quickly for some major countries
(April 2017 in the case of Germany11).
In total, given that sovereign bond purchases
could be constrained by the ECB's limits before
September 2016 for many countries (Greece, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Luxem-
bourg and Estonia according to our calculations),
we estimate that only €799.71 billion of euro-area
sovereign bonds will be purchased between
March 2015 and September 2016 (Table 3). This is
significantly less than the potential €836 billion
(€44bn x 19 months) that could have been
bought in the absence of pre-defined limits. The
difference between the two amounts should in
9. This could also be a prob-
lem if the ECB has to boost
the size of the PSPP
because of an unexpected
deflationary shock.
10. See the Annex for
detailed explanations of
how we calculate the points
at which limits are reached
and for charts for other
euro-area countries.
11. These calculations
assume constant yields at
the level prevailing at the
beginning of March 2015.
For Germany, a small
increase in short-term
yields, such as is antici-
pated by the markets from
2015 to 2017, could lift all
2-30 year bonds above the
deposit rate of -0.2 percent
and therefore increase the
outstanding amount of debt
eligible for purchases. This
would push back the date
when the limit will be
reached by a few months
from April to September
2017.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROGRAMME GUIDELINES
ON ITS SIZE AND DURATION
When will the limits be reached for sovereign
bonds?
The ECB intends to carry out the asset purchase
programme until at least September 2016, but the
Governing Council wisely left the possibility open
for PSPP to last more than 19 months. It is thus
important to know when the different limits will
constrain the length or size of the PSPP in the euro
area9.
We first look at the potential impact of the limits
on the purchases of the bonds of each country. As
an example, Figure 6 shows how the Eurosystem
holdings of Greek, Portuguese, Latvian and
German debt securities would evolve until the end
of 2017, in the case that the programme lasts that
long10.
The Greek and Portuguese cases are interesting
because they show how the limits imposed by the
ECB on QE purchases interact with previous acqui-
sitions of bonds by the ECB or the NCBs. In
Greece's case, we assume that the country will be
part of some kind of assistance programme allow-
ing its debt securities to be used as collateral at
the ECB and, therefore, to be bought in the context
of the PSPP. In any case, purchases of Greek bonds
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Figure 6: Evolution of Eurosystem sovereign holdings for Greece, Germany, Latvia and Portugal
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs, national treasuries.
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The issue of reaching the limit could become more
serious if the PSPP has to continue after Septem-
ber 2016. As Figure 7 shows, monthly purchases
will have to decrease each time a country reaches
a limit. A major turning point would be April 2017
when the limit affecting German sovereign bonds
would be reached. At that point German bond pur-
chases would fall from more than €11 billion per
month to only €3 billion per month because the
Eurosystem would only be able to buy 25 percent
of Germany’s gross issuance of 2-30 year bonds.
The inclusion of the German promotional banks,
KfW in particular, could help to compensate, but
only for three or four months. Other countries will
follow the same path until the division of pur-
chases, initially determined by capital keys,
becomes totally distorted towards certain coun-
tries. In December 2019 for instance, the monthly
12. This recommendation
could be considered in six
months as the ECB’s official
decision states that: “The
limit will initially be set at
25 percent, for the first six
months of purchases and
subsequently reviewed by
the Governing Council.”
Table 3: Sovereign bond purchases by country and by bondholder, March 2015 to September 2016
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Germany 25.6 11.2 10.2 102.3 112.5 9.2 92.0 101.2 213.7
France 20.1 8.9 8.1 80.6 88.6 7.3 72.5 79.8 168.4
Italy 17.5 7.7 7.0 70.0 77.0 6.3 63.0 69.3 146.2
Spain 12.6 5.5 5.0 50.2 55.3 4.5 45.2 49.7 105.0
Netherlands 5.7 2.5 2.3 22.7 25.0 2.0 20.5 22.5 47.5
Belgium 3.5 1.5 1.4 14.1 15.5 1.3 12.7 13.9 29.4
Greece 2.9 1.3 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.2
Austria 2.8 1.2 1.1 11.2 12.3 1.0 10.0 11.0 23.3
Portugal 2.5 1.1 1.0 9.9 10.9 0.9 8.9 9.8 20.7
Finland 1.8 0.8 0.7 7.1 7.9 0.6 6.4 7.1 14.9
Ireland 1.6 0.7 0.7 6.6 7.3 0.6 5.9 6.5 13.8
Slovakia 1.1 0.5 0.4 4.4 4.8 0.4 4.0 4.3 9.2
Lithuania 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Slovenia 0.5 0.2 0.2 2.0 2.2 0.2 1.3 1.4 3.5
Latvia 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.3
Luxembourg 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Estonia 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cyprus 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8
Malta 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.8
TOTAL 100.0 44.0 38.3 383.2 421.5 34.5 343.8 378.2 799.7
Source: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBs. Note: the first column reports the maximum monthly purchase by countries before limits are taken into
accounts. Other columns report the purchases that will take place when the 25 percent issue limit and 33 percent issuer limit as well as the
low yield limit are taken into account. Since purchases will be made at least until September 2016, we divided the analysis into 10 months
of purchases in 2015 (March through December) and 9 months of purchases in 2016 (January through September). Luxembourg, Lithua-
nia and Estonia display no purchases because of the very small amount of debt securities of these countries in the market. Even though
Cyprus is currently under review by the institutions and purchases cannot start in March 2015, we decided nevertheless to include the
country because it is impossible to know exactly when the review will turn positive. The results for Cyprus have therefore to be read with cau-
tion and as an upper bound.
principle be used for the purchases of agency
bonds, as mentioned previously, but so far there
are no eligible agencies in the countries that will
affected by the limits before September 2016. The
ECB and the NCBs should therefore quickly find
other eligible agencies in these countries if the
Governing Council really wants the €44 billion
monthly purchase level to be reached, and the dis-
tribution of purchases across jurisdictions to take
place according to the ECB capital keys.
A way to avoid this issue all together, especially if
the PSPP has to be sustained for a long time, could
be to waive the 25 percent issue limit for countries
respecting the high rating eligibility criteria, on the
basis that the probability of a debt restructuring in
which the ECB could have a blocking minority could
be considered low enough in these countries12.
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13. The full list of suprana-
tional or international insti-
tutions whose debt could
be purchased under the
PSPP is larger, as shown in
Table 1, but we exclude the
3 others because their debt
is negligible: around €1.4bn
for NIB and €5bn for the
Council of Europe Develop-
ment Bank and we could
not find any outstanding
debt for the European
Atomic Energy Community.
14. See Article 4.1 of ECB
(2015e), even if the Euro-
pean institutions’ bonds do
not always include CACs
(the ESM does, but EFSF
does not, for instance).
purchase would only be €28 billon and the shares
of Italy and Spain would be as high as 28 percent
and 20 percent, respectively, compared to the ini-
tial 18 percent and 13 percent.
When will the limits be reached for supranational
bonds?
As an illustration, we assume that NCBs will only
purchase debt securities of the EFSF, the ESM, the
EIB and the EU13. We therefore assume that the €6
billion of monthly purchases of supranational debt
will be distributed between these four institutions
according to their outstanding debt securities in
the 2-30 year range (the EFSF's outstanding debt
securities in the 2-30 year range is roughly 10
times greater than the ESM's and, therefore, the
monthly purchases by the NCBs of EFSF debt are
roughly 10 times greater than purchases of the
ESM’s debt). Of the four institutions, only the EIB
issues debt securities denominated in currencies
other than the euro. For instance, in 2013 the EIB’s
total outstanding debt securities stood at €406 bil-
lion, but were issued in 15 different currencies,
which explains why the total outstanding debt
securities denominated in euro represents just
over half of this total.
Given that the 25 percent issue limit also appears
to apply to the debt securities of these institu-
tions14, the ECB will not be able to carry out full-
scale purchases of these debt securities for very
long (see Figure 8), because the debt outstanding
in the 2-30 year range denominated in euro is not
very large. One way to avoid that problem could be
again to waive the limit on supranational bonds
with high ratings (or at least for the bonds without
CACs such as the ones of the EFSF). 
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Figure 7: Monthly sovereign bond purchases (€billions) taking limits into consideration
Sources: Bruegel based on ECB, NCBS, National Treasuries, Datastream. Note: Luxembourg, Lithuania and Estonia do not
appear on this chart given the very small amount of debt securities of these countries in the market.
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Profits from the purchase of sovereign bonds
Using these weighted-average yields for each
euro-area member, profits resulting from the sov-
ereign bond portfolios can be estimated. The prof-
its made on the sovereign debt held by the ECB
should be redistributed to countries according to
the capital keys. Purchases by NCBs will “focus
exclusively on their home market” (ECB, 2015d)
and NCBs will thus hold only their own country’s
debt. Given the absence of risk sharing for these
holdings, we assume that the profits will not be
shared between NCBs and that each NCB will keep
the profits it makes on its own sovereign bonds.
Therefore, for example, the profits on Italian bonds
purchased by the Banca d’Italia, are accrued only
to Italy. Since the NCBs typically transfer profits,
or at least a large portion thereof, back to their
treasuries, we can view the profits resulting from
PSPP as savings for the member-state govern-
ments on their interest payments. Table 4 on the
next page summarises the results of our calcula-
tions of these savings from March 2015 to Sep-
tember 2016.
Overall, our calculations show that the estimated
profits repatriated to national treasuries resulting
from sovereign QE will be almost negligible: less
than €4 billion over 19 months – the equivalent
of 0.04 percent of annual GDP – for the whole euro
area. This result was quite predictable given the
current very low level of European yields.
As a comparison, the US and the UK started imple-
menting QE in November 2008 and January 2009
respectively. When QE started in the US and UK,
10-year yields were still about 4 percent in the US
and about 3.5 percent in the UK. As a result, the
Fed generated for instance $80.5 billion (ie 0.5
percent of US GDP) in interest income on its large-
scale asset purchases in 2012 alone, while the
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility’s net
interest income was equal to £8.1 billion (ie 0.5
percent of UK GDP) during that year17 (Table 5).
These amounts were not negligible especially at
a time when budget deficits were quite high (-6.8
percent and -7.9 percent of GDP for the US and UK
respectively in 2012).
It is however difficult to draw any conclusion from
this comparison given that the Fed and the Bank of
THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE PSPP ON EURO-AREA
PUBLIC FINANCES
So far, much attention has focused on establishing
by how much yields have been reduced in antici-
pation of the programme and if they will continue
to fall as a result of the purchases. The QE experi-
ences of the US, the UK and Japan, and the SMP
carried out by the ECB from May 2010 to Septem-
ber 2012, could give an idea of the PSPP's impact
on yields. However, even though the current fall in
sovereign yields will clearly have a beneficial
impact on public finances, estimating the exact
effect of QE on euro-area yields is quite difficult15
and estimating precisely the effects on growth
and inflation and, therefore, on tax revenues is
even more challenging. That is why our goal in this
section is simply to determine the direct savings
made by euro-area governments resulting from
the profits of the PSPP ultimately being repatriated
to the various euro-area treasuries.
What are the yields on the bonds that will be
purchased by the Eurosystem?
Assuming that the monthly purchases of sover-
eign bonds by the Eurosystem (in terms of
remaining years to maturity) mirrors the distribu-
tion of outstanding debt of 2-30 years remaining
maturity for each country, we can calculate a
weighted-average-yield that the ECB and NCBs can
expect on their portfolios of sovereign debt16. The
same can be done for supranational bonds.
Given the difficulty of estimating precisely the
impact of the purchases on the yields, we assume
in our calculations that the yields will remain con-
stant and equal to the level at the beginning of
March 2015 until September 2016. This assump-
tion is of course central in the calculation of the
profits made on sovereign bonds, and another
possibility would have been to use market expec-
tations for yields for 2015 and 2016 (which
indeed predict currently a small increase in yields
over that period). However, this would have made
our calculations much more complex without
affecting significantly our results, so we have
decided to stick to constant yields. The current
weighted average yield for sovereign and supra-
national bonds can be found respectively in the
second columns of Tables 4 and 6.
15. See for instance Joyce
et al (2012) for a good
overview of the literature
aiming at estimating ex-
post the impact of asset
purchases on US and UK
yields, and Manganelli
(2012) for the impact of the
SMP on euro-area yields.
16. See the Annex for
details on the calculation of
weighted average yields.
17. See, for instance,
Nangle (2012).
11
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONEUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK QUANTITATIVE EASING: THE DETAILED MANUAL
England decided to use large-scale asset pur-
chases as one of their main tools to fight the crisis,
while for a long period the ECB’s policy response to
the crisis was mainly oriented towards ensuring
the provision of liquidity and repairing the bank-
lending channel, as suggested by Claeys (2014).
Profits from the purchase of supranational debt
securities
Purchases by the NCBs of supranational debt will
also generate profits that will then be repatriated
to each country’s treasury. Our results (Table 6)
show that income resulting from the purchases of
supranational debt will not be significant either,
which is not surprising given that yields on these
bonds are in most cases even lower than the
yields on sovereign bonds. 
Profits arising from the increase in excess
reserves induced by QE
Another consequence of the implementation of QE
by the Eurosystem will be a substantial increase
in the excess reserves held by the banking sector
Table 4: Weighted average yield and public finance savings arising from sovereign bonds purchases
March - December 2015 January - September 2016
Weighted
average yield
Total savings to
each country
€millions
Savings %
GDP
Savings %
interest
payments
Total savings
to each
country €mns
Savings %
GDP
Savings %
interest
payments
Germany 0.27% 151.9 0.01% 0.29% 371.9 0.01% 0.74%
France 0.34% 147.2 0.01% 0.31% 360.5 0.02% 0.72%
Italy 1.08% 366.3 0.02% 0.52% 898.4 0.05% 1.24%
Spain 1.00% 243.2 0.02% 0.69% 596.5 0.05% 1.67%
Netherlands 0.24% 30.6 0.00% 0.33% 75.0 0.01% 0.82%
Belgium 0.43% 31.4 0.01% 0.27% 77.0 0.02% 0.67%
Greece 9.61% 30.7 0.02% 0.42% 62.1 0.03% 0.85%
Austria 0.28% 17.2 0.01% 0.20% 42.1 0.01% 0.49%
Portugal 1.32% 62.6 0.03% 0.72% 153.5 0.08% 1.73%
Finland 0.18% 7.9 0.00% 0.31% 19.3 0.01% 0.75%
Ireland 0.69% 22.5 0.01% 0.30% 55.1 0.03% 0.72%
Slovakia 0.70% 15.3 0.02% 1.17% 37.5 0.05% 2.82%
Slovenia 0.85% 8.1 0.02% 0.67% 19.1 0.05% 1.62%
Latvia 0.63% 2.6 0.01% 0.78% 5.3 0.02% 1.62%
Cyprus 7.55% 22.6 0.13% 3.99% 35.3 0.20% 6.32%
Malta 1.46% 2.6 0.03% 1.12% 6.3 0.07% 2.66%
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, AMECO, ECB, NCBs, national treasuries and DataStream. Note: yields observed on 2 March 2015. Luxem-
bourg and Estonia do not appear in this table given the very small amount of debt securities of these countries in the market and the impos-
sibility to build meaningful yield curves. For Greece, the current yield curve might not be representative of what it will be in a few months, not
only because of the very low liquidity of the bond market, but mainly because of the current uncertainty surrounding the country and its
future in the euro area. Once these problems are resolved the yields could be substantially lower. Even though Cyprus is currently under
review by the institutions and purchases cannot start in March 2015, we decided nevertheless to include the country because it is impossi-
ble to know exactly when the review will turn positive. The results for Cyprus have therefore to be read with caution and as an upper bound.
Table 5: Interest income on asset purchases in the
US and the UK
Interest income on securities
US Federal Reserve UK APFF 
$bn % GDP £bn % GDP
2009 46.1 0.32% 2.4 0.16%
2010 76.2 0.51% 5.9 0.38%
2011 83.6 0.54% 6.1 0.37%
2012 80.5 0.50% 8.1 0.49%
2013 90.4 0.54% 8.8 0.52%
2014 115.9 0.66% 8.8 0.49%
Source: Bruegel based on Federal Reserve (press releases of 12
Jan 2010, 10 Jan 2011, 10 Jan 2012, 15 March 2013, 10 Jan 2014,
9 Jan 2015), Bank of England.
Table 6: Supranational debt securities
Weighted
average
yield %
Maximum
monthly
purchases
€billions
Purchases
Mar 2015 -
Sept 2016,
€bns
Total
income Mar
2015 - Sept
2016, €bns
EFSF 0.29 2.5 43.9 0.11
ESM 0.13 0.2 4.6 0.01
EIB 0.29 2.6 44.6 0.11
EU 0.51 0.6 11.9 0.05
Total 0.30 6.0 105.0 0.28
Sources: Bruegel based on DataStream, EFSF, ESM, EIB, EU.
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at the ECB. As pointed out by Whelan (2015) and
Bomholdt Nielsen et al (2015), the banking
system, consisting of the credit institutions and
the Eurosystem, is a closed system. Therefore the
€1.1 trillion increase in assets resulting from QE
between March 2015 and September 2016
should result in an increase of the liabilities of the
Eurosystem by the same amount. Looking in
detail at the ECB liabilities, two elements can
increase: banknotes in circulation could increase
more rapidly than usual, which seems unlikely, or
the reserves of credit institutions will have to
increase accordingly. Certainly, banks can lend to
each other, but ultimately, at the end of the day,
liquidity will have to be deposited at the ECB either
in the current account or in the deposit facility.
Given that the ECB currently applies a negative
deposit rate since June 2014 (-0.1 percent ini-
tially, brought to -0.2 percent in September 2014)
on reserves exceeding the minimum reserve
requirements held in these two facilities, the ECB
will also end up making profits on these new lia-
bilities induced by QE. Assuming that excess
reserves will increase by €60 billion per month to
reach €1.1 trillion by September 2016 and that
the deposit rate will be maintained at its current
level of -0.2 percent, the ECB will during that period
accumulate a total of €1.9 billion in extra profits
thanks to the PSPP.
CONCLUSIONS
In March 2015, the Eurosystem started imple-
menting the PSPP decided on by the Governing
Council in January. It will last until at least Sep-
tember 2016 and will complement the €10 billion
of monthly purchases carried out under the Asset-
Backed Securities and Covered Bond Purchase
Programmes, which launched in September 2014.
The additional €50 billion of monthly purchases
under the new programme will be mainly directed
towards sovereign bonds, but also towards bonds
from European supranational institutions and
national agencies.
The ECB Governing Council imposed limits ensur-
ing that the ECB will not breach the prohibition of
monetary financing. Our results show that these
limits will constrain the length and size of the pro-
gramme, in particular if it has to be renewed after
September 2016. Even before September 2016,
we estimate that if the limits are applied strictly,
only €799.7 billion of euro-area sovereign bonds
will be purchased, significantly less than the €836
billion currently planned by the ECB in that period,
because purchases will be constrained in many
euro-area countries. The possibility for NCBs to
also purchase national agency debt securities
could alleviate this concern, but the small number
of agencies eligible so far and their concentration
in only three euro-area countries could limit
severely their role as a back-up purchase.
The ECB and the NCBs should quickly find substi-
tute purchases, especially in countries in which
public debt is small and in which the limits will be
reached very quickly. Another option would be to
waive the limits for countries respecting the
investment grade eligibility criteria. The same
issue arises with debt securities from suprana-
tional European institutions, which ought to rep-
resent 12 percent of total purchases. The small
number of institutions and limited outstanding
amount of debt securities denominated in euros
ensure that 25 percent threshold will be reached
before September 2016. The same waiver could
be applied to these institutions with high ratings.
It is clear that the PSPP is already having a benefi-
cial impact on European public finances through
the very significant fall in yields that has taken
place throughout the euro area since mid-2014 in
anticipation of the programme. Concerning the
repatriation of the interest profits from the PSPP to
national Treasuries, we estimate that it will ulti-
mately be very small. This was to be expected,
given the current very low yields in the euro area.
Those such as Lonergan (2015), who were
expecting repatriation of profits from the Eurosys-
tem to national treasuries to translate into some
form of fiscal stimulus through temporary tax cuts
or public investment (as a complement to the
monetary easing to boost aggregate demand),
and into some additional leeway to comply with
the European fiscal framework, will be deeply dis-
appointed. Quicker implementation of sovereign
QE by the ECB could have reduced the debt burden
of euro-area governments by a non-negligible
amount at a time when interest rates and deficits
were very high.
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ANNEX 
Determination of SMP and other holdings and calculation of the limits for each country 
An important fact needs to be taken into account in calculating when the limits could be reached for each 
country: SMP and other Eurosystem holdings of sovereign debt will mature over the period of the asset purchase 
programme. 
Given the absence of precise data on ECB SMP holdings, to determine how the SMP holdings of each SMP 
country will decline over the length of the PSPP we take the nominal value of the outstanding SMPs as of 31 
December 2014 published by the ECB (see Table 7) and assume their maturity distribution is similar to the 
maturity distribution of that country’s current outstanding debt with less than thirty years remaining maturity, 
and we adjust it to match the average maturity of SMP holdings observed at the end of 2014. We limit the 
distribution on the long-term side for two reasons: 1) Trebesch and Zettelmeyer (2014) observed that the ECB’s 
Greek SMP purchases are skewed towards bonds with short and medium-term maturities, and 2) we do not want 
bonds that the ECB would likely not purchase, such as perpetual bonds, to distort the maturity distribution. Then 
we estimate what portion of the SMPs will be in the 2-30 year eligible range each month. We also apply this 
methodology to any other Eurosystem holdings of euro-area sovereign debt (taken from the IMF Monetary and 
Financial Statistics Database, see Table 7), without adjusting for the current average maturity, because we do 
not have such information on these holdings.  
 
For Greece, we calculate the evolution of its SMP and other portfolio holdings differently than for other countries, 
because we have precise bond information disaggregated by creditor. We can therefore know in what month the 
ECB’s and NCB’s holdings of Greek debt will fall out of the 2-30 year eligible range without having to assume a 
distribution.  
 
Table 7: Legacy holdings of sovereign bonds and assumption for new issuances 
 
Country  
SMP holdings as 
of Dec 31 2014 
(€bn) 
Other 
Holdings 
(€bn) 
Total  
Holdings 
(€bn) 
2-30 Yearly 
Issuance 
(€bn) 
Austria 0,0 2,2 2,2 17,0 
Belgium 0,0 4,6 4,6 33,0 
Cyprus 0,0 0,0 0,0 3,5 
Finland 0,0 0,4 0,4 11,0 
France 0,0 42,2 42,2 187,0 
Germany 0,0 4,4 4,4 159,0 
Greece 19,8 0,0 19,8 0,0 
Ireland 9,7 27,3 37,0 14,0 
Italy 76,2 121,7 197,9 260,0 
Latvia 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,3 
Malta 0,0 0,4 0,4 0,4 
Netherlands 0,0 0,0 0,0 48,0 
Portugal 14,9 1,0 15,9 13,0 
Slovakia 0,0 0,0 0,0 5,5 
Slovenia 0,0 0,3 0,3 2,1 
Spain 28,9 36,4 65,3 142,0 
Source: Bruegel based on European Central Bank, IMF, Irish National Treasury Management Agency,  
Ministries of Finance, Danske Bank’s forecasts. 
 
As mentioned, according to the ECB’s self-imposed rules, the ECB cannot buy more than 25 percent of a single 
issue, or 33 percent of all outstanding debt in the 2-30 year residual maturity range. Given that we only have 
aggregate data for SMP and other holdings and that we have to assume a particular maturity distribution for 
these bonds, we need to understand how these rules interact with our assumption. In order to do that, we 
considered two different scenarios and two sub-scenarios. Under the first, 2-30 year maturity SMP and other 
holdings are currently less than 25 percent of all 2-30 year outstanding debt. This could either mean that (a) the 
ECB holds less than 25 percent of all issues of in that range, or (b) that the ECB holds more than 25 percent of 
one or more issues, but that these holdings are still small enough to constitute less than 25 percent of the total. 
Under situation (a) the ECB can continue purchasing from all eligible issues until the 25 percent limit is reached, 
and they will not surpass the 33 percent aggregate limit. Under situation (b) the ECB can only buy from those 
issues for which they are still under the 25 percent limit, and only so long as they do not surpass the 33 percent 
aggregate limit. Given that we do not know the true distribution of the legacy holdings and that we have to 
assume that that they follow the same distribution as the current outstanding debt securities, we end up 
assuming that the Eurosystem currently holds the same share of each issue. Our assumption therefore leads us 
to classify all countries except for Greece into situation (a). In that case, only the 25 percent limit is binding.  
 
The second situation we consider is when the Eurosystem already holds more than 25 percent of a country’s 
debt (ie Greece). This means that the ECB holds more than 25 percent of at least one or more issues. However, 
once enough Greek SMP bonds are redeemed to bring the ECBs holdings below 33 percent of aggregate 2-30 
year debt, assuming that Greece will not issue bonds in the 2-30 year maturity range in 2015 and 2016, the ECB 
will have no other option but to purchase holdouts, which are separate issues from SMP holdings. Therefore, we 
only need to apply the 25 percent limit to new holdout purchases while still obeying the 33 percent limit.   
 
To calculate when the above limits are reached, we also need to make assumptions about the evolution of each 
country’s 2-30 year outstanding debt. We know the maturity distribution of current outstanding debt, and thus 
know how much of this debt will leave the 2-30 range each year, and we can smooth that amount out over the 
12-month period. Table 7 summarises our assumptions for gross yearly new issuance. We assume that this 
debt will follow the same distribution of current outstanding debt, and can therefore also determine what portion 
of the new issuances will leave the 2-30 year range each month. 
 
When a limit is reached for a certain country’s debt, we assume that the NCBs and the ECB will buy the remaining 
amount allowed for the limit to be binding, according to the 40/44 and 4/44 proportions respectively. However, 
after that, the Eurosystem will still be able to continue buying bonds because the total outstanding amount of 
bonds will continue to increase thanks to new issuance of bonds in the 2-30 maturity range and also because 
the Eurosystem’s holdings will mature over time. 
Together with our assumptions on the evolution of the debt and the evolution of legacy holdings, we calculate 
monthly purchases according to the following formula for all countries excluding Greece: 
 
!! =
!"#$,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! !"#!!! − ∆!"#!!! + !"#! + !"#$ − ∆!"#$ ≤ 0.25 ∗ !"#!
0.25 ∗ !"#! − !"#! + !"#!!! − ∆!"#!!!1 − !"!12 ∗ !"!!"!!! ,!!!!"! !"#$ − 1 − ∆!"#!!! + !"#! + !"#$ − ∆!"#$ > 0.25 ∗ !"#!
 
 
where all variables are (or are converted) in face value and where: 
 !"#$ is the amount the ECB would purchase according to the capital keys and without consideration of the 
limits (the third column of Table 3).  !"#!!! is the QE holdings in the 2-30 eligible range at the end of the previous month, defined as: !"#!!! = !"#!!! − ∆!"#!!! + !!!! − !!!!12 ∗ !"!!"!!"!!!  ∆!"#!!! is the portion of previous QE holdings leaving the 2-30 year maturity range at by the end of month t. !"#!  is the SMP holding at the end of month t. ∆!"#$ is the portion of the time t ECB purchase that would leave the 2-30 year maturity range by the end of 
month t.  !"#!  is the eligible outstanding debt. !"!  is the face value of today’s outstanding debt with remaining maturity i. 
 
For Greece our calculations are somewhat more complicated, as the ECB must consider both the issue and 
issuer limit. We must first evaluate in three conditions: 
(1) is !"#!!"#! ≥ .33!?!! 
(2)!is (!"#!!! − ∆!"#!!! + !"#! + !"#$ + ∆!"!!"! ∗ !"#$) ≤ .33 ∗ !"#!!?! 
(3) is (!"#!!! − ∆!"#!!! + !"#$ + ∆!"!!"! ∗ !"#$) ≤ .25 ∗ !"!!? 
 
If (1) is true: !! = 0 
If (1) is false, (2) is true and (3) is true: !! = !"#$ 
If (1) is false, (2) is false and (3) is true: !! = !.!!∗!"#!! !"#!!!"#!!!!∆!"#!!!!!∆!"!!"!  
If (1) is false, (2) is true and (3) is false: !! = !.!"∗!"!! !"#!!!!∆!"# !!!!∆!"!!"!  
If (1) is false, (2) is false and (3) is false:  
 !! = !"#"$%$! !.!!∗!"#!! !!"!!!"#!!!!∆!"#!!!!!∆!"!!"! , !.!"∗!"!! !"#!!!!∆!"#!!!!!∆!"!!"!  
where !"!  is the face Value of holdouts in the 2-30 year maturity range and ∆!"! = !"! − !"!!! 
 
The same method is used for supranational bonds, with the assumptions for issuances in 2015 and 2016 
detailed in Table 8. 
Table 8:  Assumed Issuance of EUR-denominated debt securities by Supranational Institutions 
  2-30 Issuance 2015 2-30 Issuance 2016 
EFSF 12,2 13,5 
ESM 5,6 2,8 
EIB 17,2 17,2 
EU 4,8 4,8 
Sources: Bruegel based on institutions’ investor presentations, Danske Bank’s forecasts. 
 
Calculation of weighted average yields for the determination of redistributed profits 
For all euro-area countries except Greece, we use DataStream to gather the face value, market value, yield-to-
redemption and maturity date for all outstanding government securities. For Greece we use our own dataset 
compiling face value, type of bond, maturity date and creditor for all outstanding Greek debt. We then use the 
market price and yield of six Greek benchmark bonds (from 3 years to 30 years maturity) to apply a redemption 
yield and market value to the bonds in this data set.  
The weighted average yield is: !"!.!"#$%!!"!!"!!!!"!!! , where !"!  is the market value of a bond with remaining 
maturity i. Again Greece is slightly different because the ECB will only be able to purchase holdouts (once 
enough SMPs redeem to allow for purchases). The weighted average yield for Greece is therefore !"#!.!"#$%!!"#!!"!!!!"!!! , where !"#!  is the market value of a holdout with remaining maturity i.  
 
  
Eurosystem debt holdings for other countries 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Austria 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 
25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Belgium 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Cyprus 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 
25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Finland 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: France 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 
25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Ireland 
SMP and Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 
25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Italy 
SMP and Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 
25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Malta 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Netherlands 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Slovakia 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Slovenia 
Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
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Eurosystem Debt Holdings: Spain 
SMP and Other Holdings PSPP Holdings 25% limit 
